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ABSTRACT
We present results about the effects of observing others' choices, called observational learning, on
individuals' behavior and subjective well-being in the context of restaurant dining from a randomized
natural field experiment. Our experimental design aims to distinguish observational learning effect
from saliency effect (because observing others' choices also makes these choices more salient). We
find that, depending on specifications, the demand for the top 5 dishes was increased by an average
of about 13 to 18 percent when these popularity rankings were revealed to the customers; in contrast,
being merely mentioned as some sample dishes did not significantly boost their demand. Moreover,
we find that, consistent with theoretical predictions, some modest evidence that observational learning
effect was stronger among infrequent customers. We also find that customers' subjective dining experiences
were improved when presented with the information about the top choices by other consumers, but
not when presented with the names of some sample dishes.
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Social learning has attracted increasing attention from the economics literature recently. Gen-
erally, social learning refers to any mechanism through which individuals learn from others. It
includes mechanisms in which individuals learn from each other through formal or casual/word-of-
mouth communications. It also includes observational learning, as modelled in the seminal work
by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), where individuals￿behavior
is impacted by their observation of the behavior of others because of the information contained
therein.1
Despite the large theoretical literature on observational learning and its intuitive appeal, to
establish empirically that individuals￿decisions are a⁄ected by the observation of others￿actions
because of its informational content is an not an easy task. The main challenge comes from at least
two possible confounding channels. First, observing the choices made by others also makes these
choices salient. It is thus possible that individuals follow others￿choices just because their choices
are more salient than alternative choices. Second, if individuals have conformity concerns,2 then
they may also be led to adopt the observed choices of others.
Convincing empirical evidence about the importance of observational learning is not only rel-
evant for the aforementioned theoretical literature in economics, it also has potentially crucial
implications regarding policy. Observational learning can take place, as long as the underlying
decision problems faced by individuals are similar, regardless of time, space and whether individ-
uals are socially connected; in contrast, social learning via direct communications and personal
interactions are more local and can occur only if there is time, spatial and social proximity among
individuals. If observational learning is important, then a policy maker who wants to, say, expedite
the adoption of an advantageous technology may, as a possible intervention, engage in an informa-
tion campaign emphasizing the technology￿ s popularity among other group of agents. In contrast,
if direct communication is the main channel of social learning, then such an information campaign
will not be e⁄ective.
This paper aims to provide direct evidence of observational learning (due to the informational
content of others￿choices) using a randomized natural ￿eld experiment in the setting of a medium-
scale restaurant chain in Beijing, China.3 The restaurant has a rather thick menu with many
1Bandura (1977) was the pioneering book in psychology that started the research on social and observational
learning. Chamley (2004) provides a textbook treatment of the theoretical literature in economics that studies
herding, information cascades, and observational learning. Smith and Słrensen (2000) made the distinction between
social learning in general and observational learning.
2The classic social psychology experiments documenting conformity in individuals￿judgment is Asch (1951, 1955).
See Bernheim (1994) for more related literature on conformity experiments and an economic model.
3See Harrison and List (2004) and List (2007) for surveys and methodological discussions, including categorizations,
of the surging literature of ￿eld experiments. A website http://www.fieldexperiments.com maintained by John List
provides a useful categorization and comprehensive and updated list of papers in this literature.
1dishes and customers typically have a hard time to make choices. The thick menu means that
making some dishes salient could potentially in￿ uence the consumers￿choices. In the experiment
(which involved two levels of randomization, one at the site level and another at the table level),
we randomly exposed diners to three di⁄erent information displays (or lack thereof): in the control
tables, we did not give diners any information display; in what we call ￿ranking treatment,￿we
gave the diners a display listing the ￿top ￿ve￿dishes according to the actual number of dished sold
last week; and in what we call ￿saliency treatment, ￿we gave diners a display listing ￿ve ￿sample
dishes,￿which always included the actual top 3 dishes (without being revealed as such) together
with two other randomly selected dishes, and were arranged in a random order. We analyze how
the information displays a⁄ected the choices of customers. We also conducted a short survey at
the end of the meal to gather information about bill-payers￿basic demographic characteristics, and
frequency of patronage to this restaurant chain and their subjective dining satisfaction.
The ￿ranking￿ and ￿saliency￿ treatments included in our experimental design are aimed to
explicitly incorporates the concerns for the separate estimation of pure saliency e⁄ect (i.e. saliency
without additional informational content) and the pure observational learning e⁄ect (i.e., resulting
from the informational content). Though we do not directly address the conformity channel in our
experimental design, we would like to argue that our choice of the experimental setting in a natural
situation of restaurant dining and the fact that information provided to the current customers are
those of the customers in the past likely make this channel unimportant.4
We ￿nd that, in the context of restaurant dining, depending on speci￿cations the demand for the
top 5 dishes was increased by an average of about 13 to 18 percent when these popularity rankings
were revealed to the customers; in contrast, being merely mentioned as some sample dishes did not
signi￿cantly boost their demand. Moreover, we ￿nd that, consistent with theoretical predictions,
some modest evidence that observational learning e⁄ect was stronger among infrequent customers.
We also ￿nd that customers￿subjective dining experiences were improved when presented with the
information about the top choices by other consumers, but not when presented with the names of
some sample dishes.
1.1 Related Literature
In terms of experimental design, our paper is mostly related to Salganik, Dodds and Watts
(2006). In an arti￿cial music market, they asked subjects (recruited from visitors to a particular
website) to rate a list of eight songs, then the subjects were o⁄ered an opportunity to download
the song with or without the knowledge of previous participants￿choices. Their focus is on how
4As is well-known since Asch (1955), social pressure seems to exert the most in￿ uence via conformity when
individuals are forming opinions in the presence and visibility of others. It is our belief and certainly our maintained
assumption that individuals are unlikely to order certain dishes that were popular with others due to conformity
motives.
2social in￿ uence may lead to unpredictable outcomes for popular cultural products. Our paper
di⁄ers from theirs in at least two dimensions. First, the main focus of our paper is to distinguish
observational learning e⁄ect (as a result of the informational content) from saliency e⁄ect. In our
experimental setting, the restaurant menu is thick and includes more than 60 hot dishes (together
with an additional large number of cold dishes). Diners are unlikely aware of all the alternatives,
thus saliency is an important issue that might a⁄ect their choices.5 In contrast in their setting, as a
result of the small choice set (eight songs), they could not experimentally manipulate the saliency of
the songs because all subjects were aware of the complete choice set when making choices. Second,
as we mentioned earlier conformity concerns play an important role in the demand of popular
cultural products where shared experience is a major component of the utility from consuming
such goods. Thus conformity is likely an important part of the social in￿ uence they found in their
study, which they did not attempt to distinguish. Restaurant dining is a more private experience,
and as such conformity is less a concern.
There are also several papers that examined social learning and informational cascades in lab-
oratory settings (for example, see Anderson and Holt 1997 and ˙elen and Kariv 2004). Alevy,
Haigh and List (2007) compared the behavior of professional traders from Chicago Board of Trade
and student subjects in arti￿cial lab experiments similar to those of Anderson and Holt (1997).
The experiments in these papers all have simple choice sets where the researchers explain to the
subjects prior to the experiment. Thus, again, the saliency of possible alternatives is not subject
to manipulation by the researchers.
There is also a large empirical literature attempting to identify and quantify the e⁄ect of social
learning generally on individuals￿choices in a variety of contexts. This turns out to be a notoriously
di¢ cult empirical exercise due to the identi￿cation problems that have been eloquently described
by Manski (1993, 2000). The main issue is to distinguish social learning from common unobserved
individual characteristics, which Manski (1993) called ￿the re￿ ection problem￿or ￿correlated ef-
fects.￿The existing empirical literature addresses this issue using a variety of strategies to varying
degrees of success.6 One approach is to examine the di⁄erent implications of social learning and
common unobservable shock. For example, Conley and Udry (2005) showed that pineapple farm-
ers in Ghana imitate the choices of fertilizer quantity of their ￿information neighbors￿(instead of
￿geographical neighbors￿ ) when these neighbors have a good harvest, and move further away from
5See Section 2.1 for more discussions of our experimental setting.
6An incomplete list of studies of social learning e⁄ects includes, in the context of crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman 1996), contraception (Munshi and Myaux 2000), adoption of seeds, fertilizer and other technologies
(Besley and Case 1994, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, Conley and Udry 2005; Munshi 2000; Du￿ o, Kremer and
Robinson 2005; Kremer and Miguel 2003), welfare program participation (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan
2000), stock market participation (Hong, Kubik and Stein 2001), labor market outcomes (Bayer, Ross and Topa
2005), retirement saving plan choices (Du￿ o and Saez 2002, 2003), health insurance plan (Sorensen 2005), consumer
demand (Mobius, Niehaus and Rosenblat 2005, Moretti 2007) and voting in sequential primaries (Knight and Schi⁄
2007).
3their decisions when they experience a bad harvest. They argue that this is not due to correlated
shock by showing that the choices made on an established crop (maize-cassava intercropping) for
which no learning is necessary do not exhibit the same pattern. A second approach is to exploit
the panel nature of the data to control for the common unobservables using ￿xed e⁄ects under the
assumption that the common unobservables are not time varying. An example of this approach
is Sorensen (2005) who examined the health plan choices of University of Californian employees
where he showed that after controlling for department ￿xed e⁄ects social e⁄ects still exist.7 A
third and more recent approach is via randomized experiment where ￿treatment￿(which di⁄ers in
di⁄erent papers) is randomly assigned to individuals and then behavior of others who are more or
less connected to the treated individuals is measured. For example, Du￿ o and Saez (2003) ran-
domly assigned di⁄erent information sessions about 401k options to individuals and found that
their 401k participation decisions have signi￿cant e⁄ects on their coworkers, consistent with their
non-experimental evidence (Du￿ o and Saez 2002).8
Almost none of the existing papers, however, attempts to distinguish observational learning
from the general form of social learning.9 That is, the literature does not try to ask whether
one￿ s behavior is impacted by others because he/she observed others￿choices only, or whether they
communicated and shared information in a more personal manner.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design;
Section 3 presents the basic features of our data; Section 4 spells out our identi￿cation strategy
and identifying assumptions; Section 5 describes our experimental ￿ndings; and ￿nally Section 6
concludes.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Choice of Experimental Setting
To distinguish observational learning from other forms of social learning with personal com-
munication, it is most important to conduct the experiment in a setting where, ￿rst, except for
the information about others￿choices that the researchers feed or not feed them, the researchers
are more or less sure that the subjects are not involved in any direct communication with oth-
ers; and, second, there is some commonality in the decision problems of the current subjects and
7The estimated impact of coworkers￿choices does decrease when he includes department ￿xed e⁄ects, pointing to
the presence of common unobservables.
8However, in several other settings, randomized ￿eld experiments yield results that substantially di⁄er from those
that would have been obtained with other econometric methodologies (see, for example, Du￿ o, Kremer and Robinson
2005, Kremer and Miguel 2004).
9Mobius, Niehaus and Rosenblat (2005) is an exception. They attempt to disentangle social learning in strong form
(direct information sharing) and weak form (observational learning). Their experimental design, however, includes
both forms of social learning and thus they have to rely on a structural model to disentangle them.
4others. Restaurant dining provides an almost ideal setting for this purpose. Firstly, when diners
make decisions about what dishes to order during an outing, they typically do not interact with
other diners (except for those in their table) in a particular session, and unlikely with customers
in the past. Thus, we do not have to be concerned with possibilities that personal conversations
between current and past customers that might a⁄ect the current customers￿choices occur out of
the experimental session and beyond the researchers￿observation. Secondly, diners, though with
potentially di⁄erent tastes, all care about the (common) quality of the dishes.
Restaurant dining also has other advantages for conducting our experiment. First, because of
computerization, it is very easy to obtain information of diners￿choices; second, it is relatively easy
to implement randomized treatments in terms of diners￿information set; third, we can observe the
e⁄ect of treatment on subjects￿choices accurately and instantly; fourth, we can survey on the spot
the e⁄ect of treatment on customers￿well-being in terms of their subjective dining experience.
Our experiment was conducted in a medium-sized Szechuan restaurant chain ￿Mei Zhou Dong
Po￿ (MZDP in short). MZDP is a chain with 13 separate sites in the city of Beijing, China.
Each location has an average of 50 tables, and the same menu with about 60 hot dishes (and
many additional cold dishes) are o⁄ered in all locations, though the popularity of dishes varies
by locations. The restaurant is considered medium both in scale and price level, popular to both
leisure and ordinary business dining.
2.2 Experimental Design
In our experiment, diners were randomly assigned into tables with three di⁄erent information
sets. We ￿rst describe the three information sets and then explain the actual two-stage random-
ization which we implemented. The ￿rst group of tables were simply the ￿control tables￿where
nothing was displayed on the tables; the second was ￿ranking treatment tables￿where diners
were provided with a plaque on the table displaying the names of the ￿ve most popular dishes
(varying with sites) according to the actual number of dishes sold in the previous week; the third
group of tables were called ￿saliency treatment tables￿where the diners were provided with a
plaque on the table displaying the names of ￿ve sample dishes from the menu, which included the
names of the actual top 3 dishes at that site (without being revealed as such) together with two
other randomly selected dishes. The ￿ve sample dishes were sequenced in the plaque in a random
order.
The saliency treatment tables are important in order for us to distinguish ￿observational learn-
ing￿ e⁄ect from ￿saliency￿ e⁄ect, which speci￿cally refers to the phenomenon that the dishes
mentioned on the display plaque may be chosen with higher probabilities simply because they are
more salient than other dishes on the menu, even though no information about the quality of the
dishes is revealed in the display.
We decided to implement a two-stage randomization strategy where the ￿rst stage randomiza-
5tion was at the level of restaurant sites, and the second stage is at the table level within a site. More
speci￿cally, in the ￿rst stage, we randomly selected 5 locations where tables in each location were
randomized into ￿control tables￿and ￿ranking treatment tables,￿and randomly selected 4 other
locations where tables in each site were randomized into ￿control tables￿and ￿saliency treatment
tables.￿ 10 Table 1 summarizes our experimental design.
[Table 1 About Here]
An important component of our experimental design is data collection in the week prior to
the introduction of any informational treatments. After randomly selecting the locations for the
ranking and saliency treatments, we randomly assigned tables in each of the selected locations into
￿control￿and ￿treatment￿tables, and then collected data of the diners￿choices for the week of
October 16-22, 2006, before we implemented the ranking and saliency treatments in the week of
October 23-30, 2006.11
The data collected in this pre-experiment week serves three separate purposes. First, we used
the pre-experiment data to come up with the list of ￿ve most popular dishes in the pre-experiment
week that would be displayed in the ranking treatment tables in the experiment week. The top
￿ve dishes di⁄ered by locations, and the ￿ve sample dishes in the saliency treatment locations also
di⁄ered by location. Second, the pre-experiment data allows us to conduct some test regarding
the quality of randomization. Third, and more importantly, pre-experiment data allows us to
implement a triple-di⁄erence estimator of the observational learning e⁄ect to eliminate possible
(unobservable) systematic di⁄erences between treatment and control tables.
We would like comment brie￿ y on our choice of the two-stage randomization strategy described
above, instead of using a single randomization at the table level alone. A single stage randomization
at the table level would lead to the presence of all three information treatments (control, ranking
treatment and saliency treatment) in a same location. This is desirable from the statistical point
of view, because it would allow us to estimate the di⁄erence between the saliency e⁄ect and overall
ranking treatment e⁄ect without having to assume, as we have to for our two-stage randomization
strategy, that ranking treatment locations and saliency treatment locations are similar in unobserv-
able dimensions.12 However, our choice of the two-stage randomization strategy is due to practical
considerations. The managers of the restaurant chain expressed the concern that such a single stage
randomization with three treatments in a same location would create confusion among waiters and
10We did not use all of the 13 sites because we initially had planned on another treatment.
11The restaurants implemented our experiments one day longer than we requested. (In fact, after the experiment,
they have adopted ranking information display as part of their regular business strategy.) We used all the data from
the eight-day period in our analysis presented below, but the results do not change at all if we throw away the last
day data.
12See Section 4 for more discussion about the identi￿cation strategy and how it is related to our experimental
design.
6waitresses, as well as in record keeping. Moreover, if customers found out the two di⁄erent displays
of dishes, they might raise suspicion about the restaurant￿ s intention. In our analysis, we will do
our best to test whether the randomization at the location stage is well implemented.
2.3 Post-Dining Survey
For about 20 percent of randomly selected dining parties in the experimental week, we also
administered a short dining survey (the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A) where we collected
information from the person who paid for the bill of the whole table. In particular, we collected
information about his or her gender, age, cumulative frequency of dining in MZDP, subjective
dining experience etc. It typically took less than a minute to answer the post-dining survey. All
the tables that ￿lled out the survey were given a box of poker cards and a piece of moon-cake as
tokens of appreciation.
The post-dining survey allows us to ask two important questions. First, is observational learning
a more pronounced phenomenon among infrequent customers who have less information about the
quality of the dishes than among frequent customers? Second, how does observational learning
a⁄ect customers￿subjective dining experience?
At this moment, it is useful to explain a bit about social customs about dining in China. It
is socially customary in China to have one person to be in charge of paying for the whole group￿ s
bill. Sharing the bill or separate billing is not common.13 The bill-payer is often the one who
￿treats￿the other members of the dining party and is typically the one who is most responsible for
making the dish choices.14 It is important to emphasize that the potential separation of biller-payers
and dish-orderers does not pose any problem for our analysis regarding the e⁄ect of observational
learning on dish choices and dining experience as long as it is not systematically correlated with our
randomization of control and treatment tables. However, the patronage frequency of the bill-payer
we collected in the survey may not be the relevant one for the dish-orderer, this measurement
error may have played a role in the small (though statistically signi￿cant) e⁄ect of the patronage
frequency on the strength of observational learning e⁄ect in Table 9).
3 Data
3.1 Structure of Raw Data
The restaurant records each dining party by a unique bill ID, and a unique number corresponding
to each dish ordered in that bill, together with the Chinese name and the price of that dish, are
13More accurately, sharing occurs in repeated interactions where people take turns in paying the bill.
14This is not true in formal business dining, in which the ￿host￿usually does the ordering and his/her subordinate
pays the bill. Due to this concern, we deleted 407 large bills suspected to be formal business dining in our analysis
(see footnote 15 for more details).
7also recorded. For example, suppose that eight dishes are ordered in bill ID 3135, then in the raw
data, there are eight lines with each line recording one dish. Importantly, the ￿rst line under each
bill ID records the table number where the dining party sits and the total amount spent. The table
number is then compared with our prior randomization that assigned each table to treatment or
control.
We only include bills in which hot dishes were served because the bill was typically a take out
bill (with no table assignment) if it included only cold dishes. We also deleted very large bills
which were most likely weddings and company banquets. We used 800 CNY (Chinese Yuan) as the
cuto⁄ above which the bill was considered large, after consulting with the restaurant managers.15
From a total of 13,302 bills in our data set (including both the pre-experiment and experiment
weeks), a total of 407 bills were deleted due to these considerations, leaving us a total of 12,895
bills for analysis. As can be seen in Table 1 below, 7,355 bills were from the ￿ve ranking treatment
locations, and 5,540 were from the four saliency treatment locations.
3.2 Pre-Experiment Data
In the week of October 16-22, 2006, the restaurant provided us its accounting data. We ￿rst used
the data to come up with the list of top 5 dishes, for each of the ￿ve ranking treatment locations,
and the top 3 dishes for inclusion in the display in saliency treatment locations.16 We merged
the raw data with our table assignment to treatment and control tables, and Panel A of Table 2
provides the basic summary statistics of the control and treatment tables in the pre-experiment
week in both the ranking and saliency treatment locations.
The pre-experiment data shows that our experiment design achieved randomization both at the
table and site levels. First, there are a total of 3401 bills from the ￿ve ranking treatment locations
(for an average of 97 bills per day in each location), and 2671 bills for the four saliency treatment
locations (for an average of 95 bills per day in each location). Thus, there is only slight di⁄erence
in customer volume between the ranking treatment and saliency treatment locations.
Second, notice that in the ranking treatment locations, the average bill amount is about 148
CNY, with little di⁄erence between treatment and control tables (p-value is 58% in a formal t-test of
equality of means); the average total number of dishes ordered is about 4.6, with the average for the
control tables (4.76) being slightly larger than that for the treatment tables (4.49), with the p-value
for the equality of these means being 6%. The average total bill amount in the saliency treatment
15It is worth emphasizing, though, deletion of the 407 large bills only a⁄ects the calculations of the means for
dishes ordered and bill amount, but does not at all a⁄ect subsequent analysis on the e⁄ect of observational learning
on customers￿choices. Including the 407 large bills would lead to signi￿cantly larger means for both dishes ordered
and bill amount, inconsistent with what the restaurant managers would consider as being reasonable. The 800 CNY
cuto⁄ was suggested by the restaurant managers.
16The plaques were printed immediately and sent to their relevant locations, and put on display on October 23,
2006.
8locations is about 146 CNY, again with negligible di⁄erence between treatment and control tables
(p-value is 36%). Similarly, the di⁄erence in the saliency treatment locations between control and
treatment tables in the pre-experiment week for the number of dishes ordered is also small.
Third, we can also test for the equality of means across ranking treatment and saliency treatment
locations. The p-value for the t-test for the equality of means in the average bill amount across
the two locations is 69%, and that for the average number of dishes ordered is 22%. Thus, at
least in the two dimensions we examined there, we are quite con￿dent that randomization is well
implemented at both the site and table levels. 17
[Table 2 About Here]
3.3 Experiment Week Data
The experiment with di⁄erent information treatments was conducted in the eight-day period be-
tween October 23 and October 30 of 2006. We chose to include both weekdays and weekends in our
experimental coverage period because weekends are signi￿cantly busier than weekdays; moreover,
patrons on weekends include more tourists, which allows us to test the hypothesis that observational
learning is more pronounced among infrequent patrons.
A total of 6,823 bills were collected in the experiment week. Noting that the experiment period
(￿week￿ ) actually lasted eight days while the pre-experiment period was seven days, it is quite
remarkable that the average daily number of bills was quite similar between the two periods. Panel
B of Table 2 provides some basic descriptive statistics of our experimental week data. As is clear
from the comparison of Panel A and Panel B, the average bill amount and the average number
of dishes ordered per bill do not seem to di⁄er much between the pre-experiment and experiment
week.
3.4 Data Structure and Empirical Speci￿cation
As we mentioned earlier, the raw data is organized according to each bill and each ordered dish.
We create a dummy variable for each bill and each dish on the menu, which takes value 1 if a dish
is ordered in that bill and 0 otherwise. Thus in our analysis below (reported in Tables 3-6), an
observation is a bill/dish combination. For each observation, the dependent variable of interest is
whether the dish is ordered in the bill, and the control variables include whether the dish is a top
￿ve dish in that location, whether the associated table is a treatment table, whether a treatment
occurred, the total number of dishes ordered in the bill, and the total amount of the bill. In the
most complete speci￿cation, we also include dish and location dummies. Robust standard errors
clustered at the bill ID level are calculated.
17That is not to say that there are no di⁄erences across locations. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 2, the standard
deviations for both the bill amount and the number of dishes ordered di⁄er substantially between the ranking and
saliency treatment locations.
9Speci￿cally, let Pdb indicate the dummy with value 1 if dish d is ordered in bill b; and 0 otherwise,
where d 2 f1;:::;Ndg;b 2 f1;:::;Nbg with Nd and Nb denoting the total number of dishes and
the total number of bills respectively. Thus the total number of observations in our regression
analysis is Nd ￿ Nb: Of course these observations are dependent within a bill, so we calculate the
robust standard errors clustered at the bill ID level. Depending on the speci￿cations, we will write
Pr(Pdb = 1) either as a linear function or a Probit of a list of covariates.
4 Identi￿cation Strategy
Now we explain our identi￿cation strategy for our main results about the e⁄ect of observational
learning on consumer choices.
The ￿rst empirical strategy relies only on the data from the experiment period (October 23-30,
2006). We compare the probabilities that top 5 dishes were ordered on the ranking treatment tables
and control tables in ranking treatment locations to estimate the e⁄ect of ￿being displayed as a
top 5 dish,￿or the total ranking treatment e⁄ect. We then compare the probabilities that displayed
dishes were ordered on the saliency treatment and control tables in the saliency treatment locations
to estimate the saliency e⁄ect. The di⁄erence in the two estimates provides an unbiased estimate
of observational learning e⁄ect (net of the saliency e⁄ect) under the assumption that genuine
randomization was achieved at both the table level (within the ranking treatment locations and
within the saliency treatment locations) and at the site level (that assigned sites into ranking and
saliency treatment locations).
To see this, note that genuine randomization at the table level in the ranking treatment locations
implies that the comparison of the demand of the top 5 dishes between the treatment and control
tables in these locations estimates the sum of both observational learning e⁄ect and saliency e⁄ect
(as being displayed as a top 5 dish provides both information and saliency to that dish). Similarly,
genuine randomization at the table level in the saliency treatment locations implies that the com-
parison of the demand of the displayed sample dishes between the treatment and control tables in
these locations estimates the saliency e⁄ect alone. Genuine randomization at the site level insures
that the saliency e⁄ect estimated from the saliency treatment locations is an unbiased estimate of
the saliency e⁄ect in the ranking treatment locations, thus allowing us to di⁄erence the saliency
e⁄ect estimate from the saliency treatment locations from the total ranking treatment e⁄ect esti-
mated from the ranking treatment locations to obtain the estimate of the net observational learning
e⁄ect. The results from this Di⁄erence-in-Di⁄erence (DD) approach are presented in Section 5.1.1.
While Table 2 shows that randomization seems to be well implemented at both the table and site
levels, there is always the possibility that there are unmeasured di⁄erences between the control and
treatment tables and between the ranking and saliency treatment locations. The pre-experiment
data from October 16-22 allows us to deal with the potential unmeasured di⁄erences between the
control and treatment tables by implementing an additional layer of di⁄erencing that compares the
10sales of displayed dishes on the same table between the pre-experiment and experiment week. The
results from this triple di⁄erencing (DDD) approach is presented in Section 5.1.2.
5 Results
In this section, we provide three results from our ￿eld experiment. The main result, presented
in Subsection 5.1, is the ￿nding of a signi￿cant observational learning e⁄ect, and a non-signi￿cant
saliency e⁄ect. Almost the same magnitude of observation learning is estimated from the DD and
DDD approaches, and from the linear probability and Probit speci￿cations. The knowledge that
a particular dish was among the top 5 dishes ordered by others increased the chance of the dish
being ordered by an average ranging from 13 to 18 percent, but being merely mentioned as some
sample dishes did not signi￿cantly boost their demand.
The second and third results use the subsample of bills for which we have post-dining surveys.
The second result, presented in Subsection 5.2.2, shows that customers￿dining experience improved
in the ranking treatment tables, while there was no satisfaction gain in the saliency treatment
tables. The third result, presented in Subsection 5.2.3, provides modest support for the theoretical
prediction that observational learning is more pronounced among infrequent customers who do not
have much information about the quality of the dishes.
5.1 E⁄ect of Observational Learning on Choices
5.1.1 DD Estimation Results Using Only Experiment Period Data
[Table 3 About Here]
Table 3 analyzes data from the ￿ve ranking treatment locations during the experiment period
of October 23-30. Recall that an observation here is a bill/dish combination and the dependent
variable is a 0/1 dummy indicating whether a dish was ordered in the bill. In Table 3 (as well
as Tables 4-6 and 8 below), Columns (1)-(3) report linear probability estimates and (4)-(6) report
the marginal e⁄ects from Probit estimates. Within each speci￿cation, the columns di⁄er by the
covariates included: Column (1) and (4) only include a ￿Treat￿dummy for the table where the bill
was served, and a ￿Top 5￿dummy for the dish, and an interaction for ￿Treat*Top 5￿which is 1
only when the dish was a top 5 dish and the bill was served on a ranking treatment table; Columns
(2) and (5) also control for the total number of dishes ordered in the bill, and the log of the total bill
amount; and Columns (3) and (6) control for dish and location dummies, which absorb unobserved
di⁄erences among the dishes and the locations (for example the price of the dish). The standard
errors are robust standard errors with clustering at the bill ID level, thus they account for both
heteroscedasticity and dependence in the dependent variables within a bill.
11Clearly speci￿cations reported in Columns (3) and (6) with dish and location dummies are our
preferred speci￿cations, but the qualitative and quantitative results are similar across speci￿cations.
Let us discuss Column (3) for illustration. First note that, not surprisingly, the ￿Top 5￿dummy
coe¢ cient indicates that top 5 dishes were about 13.8 percentage points more likely to be chosen
than non-top 5 dishes on control tables in the ranking treatment locations. However, the coe¢ cient
estimate of ￿Treat*Top 5￿indicates that top 5 dishes at the treatment tables, where the rankings
were displayed, were ordered with an additional 2.1 percentage points relative to non-top 5 dishes.
This relationship holds after controlling for dish and location dummies. In order to gauge the
magnitude of this e⁄ect, however, we must come up with an estimate of the base probability that
top 5 dishes were ordered. This is not transparent in Column 3 because we need to include the
dish dummy coe¢ cients corresponding to the top 5 dishes in each location. However, examining
the coe¢ cient estimates in speci￿cations (1) we can conclude that the base average probability that
top 5 dishes were ordered in control tables was about 16.2 percent (11.7 from the ￿Top 5￿dummy
coe¢ cient and 4.5 from the constant). Thus, displaying a dish as a top 5 dish increases its demand
by about 13 percent. The coe¢ cient estimates for this e⁄ect is statistically signi￿cant at 1%.18
Note that the 13 percent increase in the demand of top 5 dishes in the ranking treatment tables
includes potentially both the observational learning e⁄ect and saliency e⁄ect. Next we examine the
saliency e⁄ect only.
[Table 4 About Here]
Table 4 reports analogous regression results using the experiment period data from the saliency
treatment locations. Any e⁄ect on the demand of the ￿displayed ￿dishes on the treatment tables
will be considered as simply the saliency e⁄ect. These dishes were displayed with no information
about their popularity.
Because the ￿ve displayed sample dishes always included the actual top 3 dishes together with
two randomly selected dishes (in a randomly mixed order), the displayed dishes were 7.5 percentage
points more likely to be chosen than non-displayed dishes at the control tables (from Row 2 of Table
4). However, the coe¢ cient estimate for the interaction term ￿Treat*Displayed￿is small, less than
1 percentage points, and statistically insigni￿cant, in all speci￿cations.
It will be useful to compare the treatment e⁄ect on the demand of Top 3 dishes between the
ranking treatment locations and the saliency treatment locations. In un-reported regressions, we
indeed ran these speci￿cations, and found that the demand of top 3 dishes increase was slightly
more pronounced than that we found for top 5 dishes in the ranking treatment locations, and the
18It is also worth mentioning that the coe¢ cient estimate of ￿Treat￿ is negative and statistically signi￿cant 0.1
percentage point. That is, non-top 5 dishes￿demand is lower in treatment tables. This re￿ ects a substitution e⁄ect
in the treatment tables: as customers switch their demand to top 5 dishes, the demand for other non-top 5 dishes in
these tables is suppressed.
12e⁄ect remained statistically signi￿cant at 1% level.19 For the saliency treatment, the demand of
top 3 dishes that were merely displayed as sample dishes was not a⁄ected at all, with the coe¢ cient
estimate for ￿Treat*Displayed￿remaining small and statistically insigni￿cant.
To summarize, our ￿nding in Table 4 indicates that being made salient, i.e., being displayed
on a plaque, does not signi￿cantly attract consumers to order these displayed dishes, even for
those displayed dishes that were in fact top 3 dishes. Thus, at least in our restaurant setting,
saliency e⁄ect is small or almost zero,.20 Under our assumption that saliency e⁄ect in the saliency
treatment locations is an unbiased estimate of the saliency e⁄ect in ranking treatment locations
(which is true when randomization at the site level is well implemented), then our ￿nding in Table
3 of a signi￿cant treatment e⁄ect is close to the net observational learning e⁄ect. Of course, we
can combine the data from the ranking treatment and saliency treatment locations and run single
regressions with a triple interaction ￿Treat*Displayed* Ranking Treatment Locations￿to obtain
an estimate of the net observational e⁄ect. We do not report these regression results here for space,
but the magnitude for the coe¢ cient estimate of the above triple interaction is, not surprisingly,
similar to those we found in Table 3 for ￿Treat*Top 5￿and remains statistically signi￿cant at 1%
level.21
5.1.2 DDD Estimation Results Using Both Pre-Experiment and Experiment Period
Data
Despite our best e⁄ort to randomize over the tables within each site, one might still be concerned
that potential unmeasured di⁄erences between control and treatment tables, e.g., the treatment
tables might be more centrally located and thus might have a better view of what others were
ordering, may favor the top 5 dishes being displayed. We deal with this potential concern by
including the pre-experiment week data using a triple di⁄erencing strategy. We calculate the
change in the demand of the top 5 dishes in the treatment tables from the pre-experiment week
to the experiment week, and use the change in the demand of the top 5 dishes in the control
tables between the same periods as a benchmark to measure the temporal unobservable changes in
demand within the two week period. This DDD estimation strategy will be valid under a di⁄erent
identifying assumption, namely, under the assumption that the temporal unobservable changes
in the demand of the top 5 dishes within the two-week period were identical for the control and
treatment tables. Such an assumption is impossible to verify, but it is de￿nitely plausible.
[Table 5 About Here]
In Table 5, we use data for the ￿ve ranking treatment locations from both the pre-experiment
and experiment weeks. For each bill, even if it occurred in the pre-experiment week, we categorize it
19The results are available from the authors upon request.
20The ￿nding of negligible saliency e⁄ect certainly counters our priors.
21These results are available from the authors upon request.
13into whether or not the bill was served at a treatment table according to its table￿ s treatment/control
assignment in the experiment week. Then we de￿ne a new dummy variable ￿after￿ to indicate
whether or not the bill occurred in the experiment week. Thus, the key coe¢ cient of the triple
interaction term ￿Treat*Top 5*After￿ , which is a ￿di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence￿estimator of the e⁄ect
of ranking display on the demand of the displayed top 5 dishes: the ￿rst di⁄erence is the di⁄erence
in sales probability of top 5 dishes on the tables selected for treatment and on the tables selected
as control, separately for the pre-experiment and experiment weeks; the second di⁄erence is the
di⁄erence of the above ￿rst di⁄erence between the pre-experiment and experiment weeks. This DD
estimator eliminates potential unobservable di⁄erences among treatment and control tables and
will provide a consistent estimate of the top 5 display e⁄ect as long as the unobservable di⁄erences
among the treatment and control tables are not a⁄ected by the information displays, which is a
highly plausible assumption.
Focusing again on our preferred speci￿cation in Column (3) of Table 5 where we control of
dish and location dummies, we note that the coe¢ cient estimate for the triple interaction term
￿Treat*Top 5*After￿in this OLS speci￿cation is 3%, which is statistically signi￿cant at 1% level
and the magnitude is larger than the estimate of the interaction term ￿Treat*Top 5￿in Column
(3) of Table 3. The 3 percentage point estimate of the total ranking treatment e⁄ect represents an
almost 18% increase in the demand for the top 5 dishes.
The results for other speci￿cations are similar. This indicates that, if anything, the sales of
top 5 dishes on the tables selected for treatment were not as good as those in control tables in the
pre-experiment week, which is indeed re￿ ected in the negative estimate of the term ￿Treat*Top 5￿ .
Thus, the estimated e⁄ect of ranking display on the demand of top 5 dishes using the DD
approach and both weeks of data is very similar to those we found using just a single di⁄erence
with only the experiment week data.
[Table 6 About Here]
We analogously report the estimate of the saliency e⁄ect using the DD estimator and both weeks
of data. In Table 6, the triple interaction ￿Treat*Displayed*After￿is estimated to be positive, but
it is tiny in magnitude and statistically insigni￿cant in all speci￿cations, thus con￿rming that our
previous ￿nding in Table 4 about the insigni￿cant saliency e⁄ect on the demand for the displayed
dishes (without information about popularity) is not due to systematic di⁄erences between control
and treatment tables in the saliency treatment locations.
5.1.3 Summary and A Caveat
To summarize, we ￿nd that, depending on speci￿cations, the demand for the top 5 dishes was
increased by an average of about 13 to 18 percent when these popularity rankings were revealed
to the customers; in contrast, being merely mentioned as some randomly selected dishes did not
14signi￿cantly boost the demand for these mentioned dishes. In other words, we ￿nd that the saliency
e⁄ect is positive but very small and statistically insigni￿cant. Thus the demand increase for the
top 5 dishes in the ranking treatment was mostly due to observational learning.
Our ￿nding of signi￿cant observational learning has to be understood with an important caveat
that may lead to biased estimates for the observational learning e⁄ect and saliency e⁄ect. This
caveat is related to the customers￿perception of the restaurant￿ s motivation in putting up these
information displays. Even though in our ￿eld experiment we used the pre-experiment week data
to come up with the genuine top 5 dishes according and displayed them in the ranking treatment
locations, the consumers might be suspicious of whether such rankings were true rankings, or
were fabricated by the restaurant to boost sales of these dishes. Such suspicion might dilute the
true observational learning e⁄ect on the customer￿ s demand. Of course, customers might also be
suspicious of the motives of the restaurant regarding the display of ￿ve sample dishes in the saliency
treatment locations, such suspicion would lead to a downward bias in our estimate of the saliency
e⁄ect.22 While it is impossible to precisely evaluate the degree of downward biases in the ranking
and saliency treatment locations, it seems to be plausible that the ranking treatment is likely to be
met with more suspicion than the saliency treatment.
5.2 Results Using the Survey Data
As we mentioned earlier, for about 20% of the randomly selected bills, we administered a short
post-dining survey ￿lled out by the customer who paid the bill. This survey data is then merged
with the detailed choice and expenditure data of the bill using the bill ID. We use this merged data
to ask two questions. First, we investigate whether providing information about others￿choices (as
in the ranking treatment) improved the subjective dining satisfaction. Second, we investigate the
hypothesis that infrequent visitors, who had more di⁄use priors about the quality of dishes, might
be more prone to the in￿ uence of others￿choices.
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Data
[Table 7 About Here]
We received 644 and 693 surveys respectively for the ranking and saliency treatment locations
during the experiment period of October 23-30. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics of the survey,
again broken down by the ranking treatment and saliency treatment locations. From Table 7, the
customers of the kinds of locations were quite similar. For the ￿rst question about the cumulative
times that the bill payer had visited the restaurant chain, 36.3% in the ranking treatment locations
(and respectively 38.66% in the saliency treatment locations) reported less than 5 times, which
22Such concerns are not new, of course, because they are closely related to ￿intent to treat￿and ￿compliance￿in
the policy evaluation and clinical trial evaluation literatures (see, e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil 2001).
15we de￿ne as infrequent visitors. Respectively 40% and 45% of the bill payers in the ranking and
saliency treatment locations were female; and the age and education attainment con￿guration of
the customers were also similar across the two locations with about 82% of the customers below
40 years old and close to 70% being two year or four year college graduates. There seemed to be
more tourists in the saliency treatment locations with 19% of their customers coming from outside
of Beijing, in contrast to 11% in the ranking treatment locations. Finally, overall, about 35% of
the customers expressed to be ￿very satis￿ed￿in both ranking and saliency treatment locations.
5.2.2 E⁄ect of Observational Learning on Subjective Dining Satisfaction
[Table 8 About Here]
Table 8 presents our results about the e⁄ect of ￿top 5￿ ranking displays on the customers￿
dining satisfaction, in contrast to that of the ￿5 sample dishes.￿Di⁄erent from Tables 3-6, here
an observation is a surveyed bill, instead of a bill/dish combination. The reported standard errors
are robust and clustered at the table level (instead of the bill ID level previously). The dependent
variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the customer chose ￿Very Satis￿ed￿for Question 8 of the
survey. The covariates included vary by speci￿cations. Panel A reports that customers seated on
treatment tables with ranking information displays were 8.3 to 9 percentage points more likely to
summarize their dining experience as being ￿Very Satis￿ed￿than those seated at control tables in
the ranking treatment locations. The coe¢ cient estimates for the ￿Treat￿dummy are statistically
signi￿cant at least at 5% level for all speci￿cations. In contrast, Panel B reveals that in the saliency
treatment locations, those seated at treatment tables which displayed ￿ve randomly selected dishes
were statistically no more satis￿ed than those seated at control tables.23
Unfortunately we could not distinguish whether those at ranking treatment tables reported
￿Very Satis￿ed￿with higher frequency because the ranking display made their dish choice easier
or better, even though we do ￿nd that in ranking treatment tables those who reported ￿Very
Satis￿ed￿are more likely to order one or more of the top dishes than those who did not report
￿Very Satis￿ed.￿
5.2.3 Is Observation Learning More Important for Infrequent Customers?
[Table 9 About Here]
Now we use the survey data merged with the detailed bill information to ask whether customers
who were relatively unfamiliar with the restaurant were more likely to be in￿ uenced in their choices
23Qualitatively similar results are obtained when we use ordered Probit. We ￿nd that customers at treatment
tables in the ranking treatment locations were more likely to be ￿very satis￿ed" than those at control tables, but no
statistically signi￿cant e⁄ects are found in the saliency treatment locations. Results are available from the authors
upon request.
16by the knowledge of others￿choices. In Table 9, an observation is again a bill/dish combination,
but this time we only use the subsample for which we have surveys. We only use data from the
ranking treatment locations in the experiment week, and only report the OLS speci￿cations. We
￿rst de￿ne a dummy variable ￿frequent￿which takes value 1 if the survey respondents reported to
have visited the restaurant for 6 or more times, and 0 otherwise.24
Column (1) of Table 9 just replicates Column (1) of Table 3 using the whole sample, and Column
(2) shows the result for the subsample with the same speci￿cation. As can be seen, the basic
observational learning e⁄ect found in Column (1) for the whole sample survives in the subsample,
though the statistical signi￿cance drops from 1% to 5%. The key result in Table 9 is Column (3)
where we add an interaction term ￿Treat*Top 5*Frequent￿to allow for the observational learning
e⁄ect to di⁄er by whether or not the customer was a frequent visitor to the restaurant. The
coe¢ cient estimate is small negative 0.4 percentage point, and is statistically signi￿cant at 5%
level. Thus we conclude that the data provides modest support that the choices of frequent visitors
were less a⁄ected by the observation of others￿choices, consistent with the theoretical predictions
of observational learning models.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we present results about the e⁄ects of observational learning on individuals￿
behavior and subjective well-being in the context of restaurant dining from a randomized natural
￿eld experiment. Our experimental design aims to distinguish observational learning e⁄ect from
saliency e⁄ect. We ￿nd that the demand for the top 5 dishes was increased by an average of about
13 to 18 percent when these popularity rankings were revealed to the customers; in contrast, being
merely mentioned as some sample dishes did not signi￿cantly boost their demand. Moreover, we
￿nd that, consistent with theoretical predictions, some modest evidence that observational learning
e⁄ect was stronger among infrequent customers. We also ￿nd that customers￿subjective dining
experiences were improved when presented with the information about the top choices by other
consumers, but not when presented with the names of some sample dishes.
24We have experimented with alternative ways of creating the ￿frequent￿dummy. We only get modestly signi￿cant
estimate for ￿Treat*Top 5*Frequent￿interaction if we de￿ne ￿frequent￿ according to whether the cumulative visits
are more or less than 6, even though we always get the same negative sign. One possible reason is that 6 visits are
needed in order for a customer to be familiar enough about the menu so as not to be less in￿ uenced by the ranking
information. Another reason is that using the 6 cuto⁄ yields su¢ cient numbers of 0 and 1 for the ￿frequent￿dummy
in order to get statistical signi￿cance.
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A Appendix: Post-Dining Survey Questionnaire
The simple post-dining survey questionnaire includes the following eight questions and it took
on average less than one minute to complete.
1. How many times have you dined in this restaurant (including other branches of Mei Zhou
Dong Po)?
a.___￿rst time; b.___ 2-5 times; c. ___ 6-10 times; d. ___ more than 10 times.
2. Your Gender: a.___ male; b.___ female.
3. Your Age: a.___ 20-30; b. ___ 31-40; c. __ 41-50; d. __ 51-60
4. Your Occupation:______
5. What is your level of education? a.___ High school; b.___ 2 year college; c. __ 4 year
university; d. __ Graduate degree.
6. Which province were you born?_______
7. Do you work in Beijing? a.___ Yes; b.___ No.
8. Overall, how would you rate the dining experience? a.___ Very satis￿ed; b.___ Satis￿ed;
c.___ So so; d.___ Not satis￿ed.
20Ranking Treatment Locations Saliency Treatment Locations
(5 Locations) (4 Locations)
Control Tables No Display No Display
Treatment Tables No Display No Display
Control Tables No Display No Display
Treatment Tables
Display a plaque showing five 
most popular dishes *
Display a plaque showing five 
sample dishes**
**: The five sample dishes always include the actual top 3 dishes (without being revealed as 
such) and two other randomly selected dishes. They are displayed in random order in the 
display.
Pre-Experiment Week (October 16-22, 2006)
Experiment Period (October 23-30, 2006)
Table 1: Experimental Design
*: The five most popular dishes are displayed in the order of their rankings, with No. 1 listed 
first.Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total Bill Amount (CNY) 148.4 138.4 145.6 116.7
    Treatment Tables 147.2 135.6 143.6 119.5
    Control Tables 149.7 141.8 147.7 113.9
Total Number of Dishes Ordered 4.61 3.78 4.59 5.06
    Treatment Tables 4.49 3.77 4.45 4.82
    Control Tables 4.76 3.78 4.74 5.29
Total Number of Bills 3401 2671
    Treatment Tables 1865 1336
    Control Tables 1536 1335
Total Bill Amount (CNY) 142.6 133.2 147.9 121
    Treatment Tables 139.2 129.1 146.8 118.8
    Control Tables 146.9 138 149 123.2
Total Number of Dishes Ordered 4.91 3.77 4.9 4.48
    Treatment Tables 4.72 3.75 4.83 4.36
    Control Tables 5.15 3.78 4.96 4.59
Total Number of Bills 3954 2869
    Treatment Tables 2182 1418
    Control Tables 1772 1451
Notes: An observation is a bill.
Panel A: Pre-Experiment Data (October 16 - 22)
Panel B: Experiment Data (October 23-30)
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics in the Pre-Experiment and Experiment Data
Saliency Treatment Locations Ranking Treatment Locations
(5 Locations) (4 Locations)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
Treat -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)***
Top 5 0.117 0.117 0.138 0.113 0.11 0.107
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)***
Treat * Top 5 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.0115 0.0102 0.0102
(0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Total No. of Dishes Ordered  0.014 0.013 0.009 0.008
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Log of Total Bill Amount 0.001 0.00016 0.00043 -0.0001
(0.000)*** (0.00012) (0.00017)** (0.0001)
Constant 0.045 -0.012 -0.026
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.021)
Dish Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Location Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
No. of Observations 235052 235052 235052 235052 235052 235052
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.07
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill and dish combination. See data section for data construction.
2. For Probits in Columns (4)-(6), the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the mean.
3. Robust standard errors, culstered at the Bill ID are reported in parentheses.
4. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 3: Effect of Ranking Treatment on the Demand of "Top 5" Dishes: Using 
Experiment Week Data Only (October 23-30)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
Treat 0.001 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.001 -0.0004 -0.0005
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.;0005) (0.0004)
Displayed 0.0754 0.0758 0.0679 0.0763 0.0746 0.078
(0.0038)*** (0.0038)*** (0.005)*** (0.0038)*** (0.0038)*** (0.008)***
Treat * Displayed 0.0077 0.0078 0.0076 0.0026 0.0027 0.00215
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.00211)
Total No. of Dishes Ordered  0.0118 0.0121 0.0087 0.0079
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0002)*** (0.0002)***
Log of Total Bill Amount 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)**
Constant 0.0316 -0.0028 -0.0023
(0.0006)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0058)
Dish Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Location Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
No. of Observations 181868 181868 181868 181868 181868 181868
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.04
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill and dish combination. See data section for data construction.
2. For Probits in Columns (4)-(6), the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the mean.
3. Robust standard errors, culstered at the Bill ID are reported in parentheses.
4. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 4: Effect of Saliency Treatment on the Demand of "Displayed" Dishes: Using 
Experiment Week Data Only (October 23-30)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
Treat -0.0003 0.00127 0.00127 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0012) (0.00065)** (0.0005)** (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0005)
After 0.00358 -0.0011 -0.00065 0.00378 0.00064 0.0012
(0.0013)*** (0.0007) (0.00059) (0.00138)*** (0.00064) (0.0005)**
Top 5 0.1174 0.1162 0.1433 0.118 0.111 0.1177
(0.00467)*** (0.0046)*** (0.0055)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Treat * After -0.0048 -0.0021 -0.0022 -0.005 -0.0025 -0.0026
(0.0017)*** (0.001)** (0.0008)*** (0.002)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0007)***
Top 5 * After -0.0003 0.0012 0.00158 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0012
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.003) (0.002) (0.0021)
Treat * Top 5 -0.0123 -0.0128 -0.0114 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0037
(0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)* (0.0023)** (0.0022)** (0.002)**
Treat * Top 5 * After 0.0302 0.0302 0.0320 0.0174 0.016 0.0149
(0.00852)*** (0.008)*** (0.0084)*** (0.0044)*** (0.004)*** (0.0039)***
Total No. of Dishes Ordered 0.0142 0.0136 0.0086 0.0074
(0.0002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Log of Total Bill Amount 0.0069 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)** (0.0007)*
Constant 0.0414 -0.0127 -0.0765
(0.0096)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0238)***
Dish Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Location Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 448371 448371 448371 448371 448371 448371
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.07
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill and dish combination. See data section for data construction.
2. For Probits in Columns (4)-(6), the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the mean.
3. Robust standard errors, culstered at the Bill ID are reported in parentheses.
4. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 5: Effect of Ranking Treatment on the Demand of "Top 5" Dishes: Using Data from 
Both Pre-experiment and Experiment Weeks (October 16-30)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
Treat -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004)
After -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.00075 -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0004)** (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Displayed 0.070 0.0708 0.0625 0.0704 0.069 0.0685
(0.0039)*** (0.0039)*** (0.0047)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
Treat * After 0.0011 0.0001 0.0001 0.0012 -0.00006 0.00009
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Displayed * After 0.005 0.0050 0.0052 0.0027 0.00237 0.0023
(0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0022)
Treat * Displayed 0.0057 0.0058 0.00567 0.0026 0.00247 0.0021
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.00568) (0.0027) (0.00260) (0.0023)
Treat * Displayed * After 0.00199 0.0020 0.00196 -1.68e-6 0.00018 0.00004
(0.00795) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.00353) (0.00339) (0.0029)
Total No. of Dishes Ordered 0.0118 0.0122 0.0088 0.008
(0.001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)***
Log of Total Bill Amount 0.0001 -0.00002 -0.00007 -0.00017
(0.000)** (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00005)***
Constant 0.0323 -0.0022 -0.0155
(0.0006)*** (0.0004)*** (0.00296)***
Dish Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Location Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 346649 346649 346649 346649 346649 346649
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.04
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill and dish combination. See data section for data construction.
2. For Probits in Columns (4)-(6), the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the mean.
3. Robust standard errors, culstered at the Bill ID are reported in parentheses.
4. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 6: Effect of Saliency Treatment on the Demand of "Displayed" Dishes: Using Data 
from Both Pre-experiment and Experiment Weeks (October 16-30)Ranking Treatment Locations Saliency Treatment Locations 
(644 Surveys) (693 Surveys)
Survey Q1: How many times have you dined in this restaurant?
First time 14.29 18.15
2-5 times 22.54 20.51
6-10 times 13.55 11.88
10+ times 49.63 49.46
Survey Q2: Your gender?
Male 60.39 55.22
Female 39.61 44.78
Survey Q3. Your age?
20-30 36.13 39.36
31-40 45.87 42.22
41-50 13.19 14.39
51-60 4.81 4.02
Survey Q5: Do you have a college and higher degree?
high school 10.09 14.8
2 year college 23.83 28.82
4 year uinversity 45.65 35.76
graduate degree 20.44 20.62
Survey Q7: Do you work in Beijing?
Yes 88.7 80.92
No 11.3 19.08
Survey Q8: Overall, how would you rate the dining experience?
Very Satisfied 34.31 35.8
Satisfied 58.95 54.05
So so 6 9.6
Not satisfied 0.74 0.55
Notes: Percentage reported.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Data(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
Treat 0.0833 0.0898 0.0891 0.0833 0.0906 0.0899
(0.0428)** (0.0425)** (0.0428)** (0.0428)** (0.0429)** (0.0430)**
Obsevations 644 640 640 644 640 640
R-squared 0.0074 0.0190 0.0198
Treat 0.0261 0.0271 0.0280 0.0261 0.0244 0.0258
(0.0370) (0.0372) (0.0372) (0.0370) (0.0362) (0.0360)
Obsevations 693 680 680
R-squared 0.0024 0.0096 0.0118
Additional Controls:
Age Interval Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
College Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Gender Dummy No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Tourist Dummy No No Yes No No Yes
Cumulative Visits No No Yes No No Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating "very satisfied".
2. Data from the experiment week is used in this analysis.
3. For Probits in Columns (4)-(6), the reported coefficients are marginal effects at the mean.
4. Robust standard errors, culstered at the table level are reported in parentheses.
5. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 8: Effects on Dining Satisfaction: Ranking Treatment vs. Saliency Treatment
Panel A: Ranking Treatment
Panel B: Saliency Treatment(1) (2) (3)
Whole Sample Survey Sample Survey Sample
Treat -0.005 -0.006 -0.005
(0.001)*** (0.0057) (0.0059)*
Top 5 0.117 0.122 0.119
(0.004)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)***
Treat * Top 5 0.018 0.019 0.0196
(0.006)*** (0.009)** (0.009)**
Treat * Top 5 * Frequent -0.0004
(0.0002)**
Constant 0.045 0.043 0.043
(0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Dish Dummy No No No
Location Dummy No No No
No. of Observations 235052 48843 48843
R-squared 0.021 0.022 0.0223
Notes:
1. An observation is a bill and dish combination. All regressions are OLS regressions.
3. Robust standard errors, culstered at the Bill ID are reported in parentheses.
4. *, ** and *** represents respectively significance at 10%, 5% and 1%.
Table 9: Frequent Customers Respond Less in the Ranking Treatment
2. The variable "Frequent" is a dummy that takes value 1 if the answer to post-dining survey Q1 is 
either a (first time) or b (2-5 times).